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The thesis studies target capital structures in the context of 1,290 acquisitions. In particular, the 
thesis analyses whether firms have target leverage ratios and whether they affect the choice of 
payment in the transaction. It illustrates that overleveraged bidders are less likely to pay for the 
acquisition with cash only. Moreover, the thesis examines the post-acquisition changes within 
the firm’s capital structure and its adjustment speed. Addressing the change of target leverage 
after the transaction, the results suggest that managers consider the future target leverage of the 
combined firm in their acquisition’s financing choices. Firms with high growth opportunities 
use the merger-induced change in target leverage for leverage adjustment, to a greater extent 
than firms with smaller growth opportunities. Firms tend to adjust their market leverage towards 
target by 39% every year, on average. Taking into account the leverage effect of the merger, it 
is shown that about 47% of an acquirer’s leverage deviation caused by the merger is reversed 
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Esta tese debruça-se sobre as metas da estrutura de capital, no contexto de 1,290 aquisições. 
Em particular, a tese estuda se as empresas têm índices de alavancagem alvo e se estes afetam 
a escolha do pagamento na transação. De facto, a tese ilustra que os licitantes que estão sobre 
alavancados são menos propensos a pagar em dinheiro pela aquisição. Adicionalmente, a tese 
analisa as mudanças existentes no pós-aquisição dentro da estrutura de capital da empresa e na 
sua velocidade de ajustamento. Acerca da mudança na meta de alavancagem causada pela 
transação, os resultados sugerem que nas opções de financiamento da sua aquisição, os gerentes 
consideram como futura meta de alavancagem a da empresa combinada. As empresas com 
maiores perspetivas de crescimento tiram maior proveito de uma mudança na meta de 
alavancagem para o seu ajustamento do que as empresas com menores perspetivas de 
crescimento. As empresas tendem a ajustar a sua alavancagem de mercado para uma meta em 
média de 39% a cada ano. Tendo em conta o efeito de alavancagem da fusão, é sugerido que 
cerca de 47% do desvio de alavancagem causado pela fusão no adquirente é revertido após 
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1.  Introduction  
1.1 Research Problem Description  
 
Despite the extensive research since the introduction of the modern capital theory by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), firms’ capital structure behaviours are still not fully explained by the 
available theories. One of the main theories amongst researchers that focus on explaining capital 
structure decisions is the trade-off theory of leverage. It suggests that firms intend to balance 
the costs of debt against its benefits, such as tax benefits of interest payments (Miller 
& Modigliani, 1958). The pecking order model, on the other hand, proposes a hierarchy of 
financing choices aimed at minimizing adverse selection costs, rather than the target ratio of 
the trade-off theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
It has been studied extensively, whether firms have meaningful target capital structures and 
how target deviations influence corporate decisions. However, the results of previous studies 
are mixed.  Relevant corporate decisions to influence a firm’s capital structure are, amongst 
others, stock issuances and the financing decisions of acquisitions. According to Uysal (2011), 
the effect of leverage deviation in the context of security issuance is widely studied; yet, the 
research on leverage deficits within corporate acquisition decisions is still limited.  
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) study the influence of leverage deficit on the choice of 
financing an acquisition and furthermore, the post-acquisition capital structure changes. The 
main conclusion of their research supports a capital structure model which integrates a target 
level and adjustment costs (Harford et al., 2009). Uysal (2011) extends the research of capital 
structures in the context of acquisitions by studying the likelihood of a firm making an 
acquisition based on the leverage deviation and he concludes that overleverage poses an 
obstacle in pursuing the opportunity of acquiring a firm.   
 
1.2 Objective and Hypotheses Development  
 
This thesis aims to contribute towards the existing literature focused on capital structure 
behaviours by studying the relevance of leverage targets using takeovers of a more recent period 
including the financial crisis of 2007-08. The focus of the thesis is to investigate the payment 
methods of acquisitions and the post-acquisition leverage changes to potentially find evidence, 




previous studies such as Uysal (2011) and Harford et al. (2009) hold true for a different sample 
period of acquisitions by including the financial crisis and post-crisis years.  
The thesis aims initially to study the role of financial deficit.  
1. Do managers consider the firms’ deviation from the target leverage ratio when choosing 
the payment method for acquisitions?  
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s deviation from its target ratio influences the choice of payment 
method used for acquisitions.  
Second, the thesis focuses on the post-acquisition changes within the firm’s capital structure by 
analysing the changes of the firm’s capital structure and its deviation from its target ratio.  
2. Do the firms converge to their leverage ratio after the acquisition and what is the speed 
of adjustment?  
Hypothesis 2: The deviation from the firm’s target leverage induced by a merger or 
acquisition is not permanent and the firm aims to reduce the divergence.   
As proposed by Harford et al. (2009), five years of post-acquisition data is needed to study the 
capital structure adjustment and therefore, the sample of acquisitions used for the thesis includes 
acquisitions from 1993 to 2012 within the United States.   
 
1.3 Thesis Contribution  
 
The thesis contributes to the capital structure research by analysing a recent sample of 
acquisitions. Building upon Harford et al. (2009), the thesis extends the acquisition sample by 
including the financial analysis and comparing the pre- and post-crisis time. The findings of the 
thesis are mostly consistent with the previous research on this topic such as Uysal (2011), 
Harford et al. (2009) and Tao et. al. (2017), for example.  
Addressing the first research question, the result of the thesis indicates that overleveraged 
bidders are less likely to pay for the transaction with cash and are therefore less likely to use 
debt financing. However, it was not proven that overleveraged firms are more likely to pay the 
acquisition with stock instead. Rather, overleveraged firms tend to use a mixed payment 
method, which includes both stock and cash.  
The second research question aims to provide evidence that firms converge towards a target 




by approximately 39% every year, while the book leverage adjustment amounts to roughly 
44%, which is similar to previous research. In addition, it is shown that about 47% of an 
acquirer’s leverage deviation is reversed after five years. Overall, the thesis’s results support 
the trade-off theory hypothesis. 
The thesis proceeds as follows:  Section 2 gives an overview of the literature addressing capital 
structure behaviours and financing choices within acquisitions. The third section addresses the 
methodology and construction of variables. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 
focuses on the hypotheses, presenting and analysing the results. Finally, section 6 concludes 
the thesis with a discussion of the results and further research.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Research related to Capital Structure  
 
The way firms choose their capital structures is still an open and relevant question within the 
field of corporate finance research. The appropriate capital structure is crucial for the firm’s 
growth and survival; furthermore, capital structure decisions are important for understanding 
investment behaviours with regards to the implementation of policies.  In 1984, Myers claims 
we know very little about “how firms choose their debt, equity and hybrid securities“ and names 
the issue the “capital structure puzzle“  (1984, p. 575). Almost thirty years later, the capital 
structure puzzle is still not completely solved. Graham and Leary (2011) review capital 
structure research papers, which have been published since 2005. They conclude that the 
existing research only partially explains the capital structure behaviours and further research is 
crucial.  
Within the capital structure research there are three well-known theories – pecking order, 
market timing model and static trade-off, which aim to explain firms’ capital structure 
behaviours. Conflicting conclusions exists among researchers about these theories and one 
might even claim that “No single theory of capital structure is capable of explaining all of the 
time- series and cross-sectional patterns that have been documented.” (Ritter & Huang, 2009, 
p. 238).  
The pecking order model suggests a hierarchy of financing choices aimed at minimizing 
adverse selection costs. The traditional pecking order model was proposed by Myers and Majluf  




favoured over equity. Firms follow a preference of debt first, then hybrid securities and lastly 
equity, hence, there is “[..] no well-defined target debt-equity mix, because there are two kinds 
of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom.” 
(Myers, 1984, p. 581). Moreover, it can be favourable to stockholders for the firm to forego 
positive investments rather than issuing high risk debt or new stock, which would be the case 
when the cost to existing shareholders of issuing new shares at a bargain exceed the project’s 
positive cash flow (Myers & Majluf, 1984, p. 188). The authors’ model predicts that stock 
prices will fall when managers have superior information and new stock is issued. Therefore, it 
is crucial for firms to build financial slack to undertake investment opportunities with positive 
NPV. With reference to Myers and Majluf (1984), firms can build financial slack through 
restricting dividends or issuing stock when the information advantage of management towards 
stockholders is minimal.  
In contrast to the pecking order model, the static trade-off model suggests a capital structure 
consisting of an optimal ratio of debt and equity debt (Graham & Leary, 2011; Miller 
& Modigliani, 1958). Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose that in a perfect capital market 
setting without taxes and distress costs, the value of a firm should not depend on its capital 
structure, which is known as the irrelevance assumption. However, the irrelevance assumption 
does not hold true in a real-world market with imperfect conditions. Based on the imperfect 
market conditions, the traditional trade-off theory of leverage suggests a model in which the 
firm aims at balancing the costs and benefits of debt (Graham & Leary, 2011; Miller 
& Modigliani, 1958). Financial distress costs are defined as cost of debt, whereas the benefits 
of debt can be tax benefits of interest payment and mitigation of agency costs (Graham & Leary, 
2011; Miller & Modigliani, 1958).  
Another model aimed at explaining capital structure decisions is a model, which considers 
market timing. Wurgler and Baker (2002) test on a sample consisting of Compustat firms with 
an IPO date between 1968 and 1998 “[..] whether market timing has a short-run or even a long-
run impact [..]” on capital structure (p. 2). The main finding is that fluctuations in the market 
value have “[..] large and persistent effects on capital structure.” (Wurgler & Baker, 2002, p. 
2). The authors claim that this effect is hard to explain through pecking order because due to 
the adverse selection managers avoid issuing stock and furthermore, trade-off theory assumes 
that temporary market to book ratio difference should have only temporary effects (Wurgler 
& Baker, 2002). In other words, “[..] capital structure is the cumulative outcome of attempts to 




While Wurgler and Baker find evidence of capital structures, that could not be explained by the 
trade-off theory or the pecking order model, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) show that firms 
use debt to compensate anticipated finance deficits, which supports the pecking order model 
(1999, p. 242). Kayhan and Titman (2004) show that “[..] that over time, financing choices tend 
to move firms towards target debt ratios that are consistent with the tradeoff theories of capital 
structure.” (p. 1). However, the speed of adjustment is relatively low and a firm’s deviation 
from target leverage is based on its cash flows and investment needs. They claim that changes 
in capital structure are caused by financial deficits as previously confirmed by Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) (Kayhan & Titman, 2004). Furthermore, with reference to Welch, stock 
returns effect the deviations from the firms target ratios (Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Welch, 
2004). While Baker and Wurgler (2002) studied the effect of market timing on capital structure 
in terms of past stock market returns, Welch (2004) investigates “[..] the failure of firms to undo 
the effects of stock returns and the consequent strong relation between lagged stock returns and 
capital structure” (p. 106). The author concludes that stock returns can explain a large part of 
debt ratio variations and moreover, “When stock returns are accounted for, many other proxies 
used in the literature play a much lesser role in explaining capital structure.” (p. 106). Consistent 
with Welch (2004), Kayhan and Titman (2004) also highlight the greater effect of stock returns 
than financial deficits on target debt ratios (2004). This could be explained by the fact that high 
stocks returns are likely caused by higher growth opportunities and therefore, linked to lower 
target debt ratios (Kayhan & Titman, 2004). Furthermore, Kayhan and Titman (2004) find 
evidence that the effects caused by stock price changes and financial deficits reverse over time 
in the leverage regressions, thus, supporting the theory that firms have target ratios.  To further 
test the theory of firms adjusting towards a target ratio, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) 
include the assumption that firms target ratio might change over time and incorporate a wide 
range of financing options such as repurchasing equity or retiring debt. Their study concludes 
that firms make financing choices based on a target leverage ratio, which plays a higher role in 
repurchases and debt retirements than in equity and debt issuances (Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, they show that stock prices play a relevant role by observing that firms rather 
issue equity than debt when stock prices are increasing, and through showing “[..] that more 
profitable firms have, on average, lower leverage ratios.” (Hovakimian et al., 2001, p. 3).  
In addition, Roberts and Leary (2005) further prove the theory of a target capital structure in 
the context of adjustment costs, which implies that it might be suboptimal for firms to rebalance 




costs are introduced and that firms actively rebalance their debt ratio infrequently but in clusters 
(Roberts & Leary, 2005). They also test the main market timing variable as in Wurgler and 
Baker (2002) and find that its effect mitigates with adjustment cost, and as a consequence, 
adjustment costs influence the speed of adjustment. Moreover, they find evidence supporting 
the pecking order theory, i.e. firms prefer using internal financing for large investments 
(Roberts & Leary, 2005).  
Another interesting study investigating both the trade-off model and pecking order is executed 
by Fama and French (2002) by testing the predictions in regard to leverage and dividends. 
Concerning the trade-off theory, the study tests whether leverage is mean-reverting, whereas, 
the pecking order is tested through analysing how financing decisions react to variations in 
earnings and investments (Fama & French, 2002). The authors infer that both theories share 
many predictions; yet, they find evidence that “[..] more profitable firms are less levered.”, 
which confirms the pecking order but contradicts the trade-off theory (Fama & French, 2002, 
p.1). Moreover, they find strong evidence that “[..] firms with more investments have less 
market leverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and a complex pecking order 
model.”  (Fama & French, 2002, p. 1).  
Also, Byoun (2008) states: “[..] the two competing theories, which have largely been evaluated 
in isolation from one another, can and should be viewed as complements.” (p. 3069), and thus, 
the researcher combines both models with investigating the capital stricture adjustment speed 
dependent on financial deficits or surpluses.  The analysis provides the conclusion that “[..] 
firms make the most significant adjustments toward the target when they have above-target debt 
with a financial surplus.” (Byoun, 2008, p. 3071). While it is concluded that firms incur higher 
adjustment costs in issuing debt when there is a debt level below the target (Byoun, 2008). In 
addition, firms’ capital structures are adjusted slower at the time of financial deficits than with 
surpluses, which results from firms’ financial constraints. Yet, “[..] the capital structure 
adjustments for both constrained and unconstrained firms show the same pattern: lowering 
above-target debt with a financial surplus and increasing below-target when facing a financial 
deficit.”  (Byoun, 2008, p. 3094). Byoun (2008) concludes that the traditional pecking order 
does not explain the influence of adverse selection costs and therefore, benefits of debt, adverse 
selection cost and other costs should be part of a combined theory of capital structures.  
While Byoun (2008) tested the pecking order and the trade-off model, Flannery and Rangan 




is their speed of adjustment and moreover, adding market timing or pecking order variables to 
the analysis. The results show a quick adjustment speed towards firms’ target leverage ratios, 
in particular, the mean sample firm closes its market leverage gap by more than 30% per year, 
which is not consistent with some of the previously introduced studies such as Baker and 
Wurgler, (2002), and Fama and French (2002) (Flannery & Rangan, 2006). It is argued that the 
different results stem from the failure to account for a partial adjustment, as implemented in 
Flannery and Rangan’s model. Overall, the study finds strong evidence in favour of a target 
capital structure for the sample of nonfinancial Compustat firms from 1966 to 2001.  While the 
variables of the pecking order and market timing model are statistically significant, they are 
less relevant than the adjustment towards target ratio (Flannery & Rangan, 2006).  
 
2.2 Research related to Financing and Leverage Ratios within Acquisitions   
 
In addition to the capital structure theories introduced in the previous chapter, empirical work 
also illustrated financing choices and capital structure deviations specifically for acquiring 
firms, which is another important component of this thesis. One study which investigates the 
effect of acquirer and target characteristics on the method of payment was executed by Martin 
(1996) through studying 846 corporate acquisitions in the period of 1978 to 1988. The study 
argues that the most relevant variables are first, the mode of acquisition, for instance, tender 
offers are likely to be cash-financed, and second, the acquirer’s investment opportunities due 
to the evidence that with higher investment opportunities acquirers are more likely to use stock 
financing (Martin, 1996). In addition to the method of payment, the financing decisions play a 
relevant role in the context of mergers. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) claim to be the first 
study to investigate simultaneously both the payment and financing decisions through a sample 
of 1,361 completed mergers and acquisitions between 1993 and 2001 in Europe. The authors’ 
results show that acquirers have a preferred financing choice depending on their firm 
characteristics and the cost of capital plays a relevant role in the financing choice, whereas the 
agency cost seem to be less relevant.  Moreover, their evidence is consistent with the pecking 
order theory that acquirers with high cash reserves use internal funds, while bidders facing 
internal funds deficits chose to issue debt and acquirers with high stock prices chose to issue 
equity (Martynova & Renneboog, 2009).  
Another important aspect within the process of acquisitions is the competition among bidders 
and their likelihood to win. Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) claim that competition influences the 




a sample of 1,926 takeovers of the period of 1980 to 2005 and “[..] predicts that a bidder with 
the lower leverage is likely to win in a takeover contest (unless the target firm is highly 
levered).” (p. 573). Moreover, the model shows that the winning firm should increase its 
leverage after the takeover completion (Morellec & Zhdanov, 2008), which is also consistent 
with Welch (2004) who claims “[..] that firms that have engaged in mergers and acquisitions 
activity tend to increase leverage.” (p. 120).  
Further empirical research addressing leverage ratios within acquisition was completed by 
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009), by investigating the concept of a target ratio with a sample 
of 1,188 large takeovers between 1981 and 2000. Their results support a capital structure model 
which includes a target level and adjustment costs. Moreover, they conclude that the acquirer 
is less likely to issue debt when its overleveraged in comparison to its predicted target capital 
ratio and firms that finance acquisitions with debt, tend to actively move back towards their 
target ratio in the following years (Harford et al., 2009). Furthermore, Uysal (2011) provides 
additional evidence by studying the influence of firms’ leverage deficits on their acquisition 
behaviour through a sample of 7,814 acquisitions in the period of 1990 to 2007. It is concluded 
that firms, which have higher leverage than their predicted target capital structure are less likely 
to pursue an acquisition and moreover, pay lower premiums and are less likely to use cash as 
the payment method (Uysal, 2011). Yet, the probability of acquiring is not symmetric because 
underleverage has a negligibe effect on the likelihood of acquiring (Uysal, 2011). Besides, the 
study proves that firms rebalance their capital structure towards target ratio through finding that 
overleveraged firms adjust their leverage ratio by issuing equity and the likelihood of 
rebalancing is higher when the firm is anticipating to make an acquisition (Uysal, 2011).  
 
3. Methodology and Variables Construction  
3.1 The Leverage Variable  
 
In order to address the research question, it is crucial to define leverage ratio. Many researchers 
use market leverage as variable to study capital structure behaviours (Hovakimian et al., 2001; 
Welch, 2004; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Harford et al., 2009; Uysal, 2011). On the other hand, 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue for using book leverage ratio because “[..] changes in the 
book debt ratio reflect what might be called "active rebalancing" [..]“, while varying market 
leverage can be caused by “[..] unanticipated changes in the stock price that may not be in the 




leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Fama & French, 2002; Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Ritter 
& Huang, 2009). Comparing the results of both variables, no crucial divergence is shown. To 
ensure resemblance to similar studies, the thesis primarily uses market leverage. However, to 
study capital structures in the context of acquisition, the book leverage ratio can be more 
appropriate in order to exclude stock price fluctuations due to deal announcement and 
completion (Khoo, Durand, & Rath, 2017; Tao, Sun, Zhu, & Zhang, 2017). Therefore, book 
leverage is also used to ensure robustness and to compare the results to previous studies.  
In addition to the differentiations between book and market value, there are varying definitions 
of leverage, which can result in measurement errors and thereby causing contradicting 
conclusions within the research (Graham & Leary, 2011). Welch (2011) claims that the 
common measure of leverage ratio as determined by financial debt scaled by assets considers 
non-financial equities as equity, which results in an incorrect estimation. Yet, the author states 
that there is no universal measure, which can be applied and the measure depends on the context 
of the research question (Welch, 2011). Thus, the thesis is guided by previous studies, which 
constructed a model to predict target leverage ratios. The thesis defines market leverage ratio 
as (book debt) / (total assets minus book equity plus market equity), (Kayhan & Titman, 2004). 
The book leverage ratio is defined as (book debt) / (total assets), whereby book debt is total 
assets subtracted by book equity following Uysal (2011). Book equity is then defined through 
book value of shareholder’s equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
minus preferred stock, whereby the shareholder’s equity is determined by total assets subtracted 
by liabilities (French, 2018b; Uysal, 2011).  
 
3.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
After defining leverage, it is important to examine the determinants of capital structure in order 
to construct the model for predicting leverage. The thesis incorporates the following set of firm 
characteristics used in the capital structure literature.  
Firm size (size): One variable which is often included in models explaining capital structures is 
firm size (e.g. Hovakimian & Li, 2011; Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Marsh, 1982). Most studies 
conclude that firm size, which is measured by the natural logarithm of sales in this thesis, is 
positively correlated to leverage (Harford et al., 2009; Kayhan & Titman, 2004). Larger firms 




Zingales (1995), size could be “[..] an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy.” (p. 
1451). 
Profitability (profit): Variables related to the firm’s profits are often included in similar studies 
(e.g. Bharath, Pasquariello, & Wu, 2006; Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Uysal, 2011). In this thesis, 
profitability is determined by the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA) scaled by total assets. According to the trade-off theory, profitability is expected to 
have a negative correlation with leverage due to the tax benefits of debt. Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) confirm that firms which increase their leverage have a higher operating income than 
firms which reduce their leverage. In an earlier study by Titman and Wessels (1998) the 
opposite is found, which is that profitable firms have lower debt to market equity ratio. 
Therefore, it can be said that the relationship is not clear, as pointed out by Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), “A firm with higher earnings per asset dollar could prefer to operate with either lower 
or higher leverage.” (p. 476). 
Asset Tangibility (tang): Many models include a variable to capture a firm’s tangible assets by 
estimating the ratio of net plant, property and equipment to total assets (e.g. Harford et al., 2009; 
Khoo et al., 2017; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). A common understanding amongst researchers is 
that firms with more tangible assets have higher leverage because tangible assets serve as 
collateral and therefore, bankruptcy costs are lower for these firms (Antão & Bonfim, 2014; 
Frank & Goyal, 2003).  
Market-to-book assets (M/B): Another variable, which often occurs in previous literature aims 
on capturing future growth opportunities through measuring the ratio of market to book value 
of assets (e.g. Frank & Goyal, 2009; Harford et al., 2009; Hovakimian, Hovakimian, & 
Tehranian, 2004). The expected effect on leverage is negative as firms avoid issuing debt to 
protect their investment opportunities (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Khoo et al., 2017).  
Research and development expense: A variable focused on R&D spending is implemented in 
the model to capture a firm’s product uniqueness (e.g. Hovakimian & Li, 2011; Kayhan 
& Titman, 2004; Uysal, 2011). As many firms do not have research expenses, it is considered 
a dummy variable (R&DDummy), which takes the value of one when a firm records R&D 
expenses. Previous research concluded that firms with high R&D spending prefer to issue more 
equity than debt, which results lower leverage (Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Hovakimian et al., 




Selling expense (SellExp): Another variable aimed on addressing firms’ unique and specialized 
products is selling expense (e. g. Harford et al., 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Kayhan 
& Titman, 2004). The selling expenses scaled by net sales are expected to have a negative effect 
on leverage because the firm has more unique products, which can result in higher bankruptcy 
costs and therefore suggest decreased debt (Hovakimian et al., 2004).  
Depreciation (Dep): To capture the tax shields attained outside of debt financing, a variable 
measured by depreciation and amortization expenses sized on assets is included in the model 
(e.g. Antão & Bonfim, 2014; Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, & Smith, 2012; Khoo et al., 
2017). It is assumed that higher depreciation expenses reduce the need of debt financing by 
providing tax shields.  
Industry (IndDummy): Lastly, the model includes industry dummies to capture industry 
specific characteristics, which are not captured by the other variables (e.g. Kayhan & Titman, 
2004; Khoo et al., 2017; Uysal, 2011). The industry dummies are based on the Fama and French 
(1997) twelve industry definitions obtained from French’s website (2018a; van Alfen, 2017).  
The following Table 1 summarizes the expected effects of the explanatory variables of the 
model according to literature. An overview of the calculations of all variables can be found in 
the Appendix 1.  
 
Table 1: Overview Explanatory Variables 
 
 Variable Expected Effect on Leverage 
Firm Size  + 
Profitability  + - 
Tangibility + 
Market to Book Ratio - 
Research & Development Dummy - 




3.3 Prediction Model & Leverage Deviation  
 
After defining the dependent variable (leverage) and the explanatory variables, the model to 
predict a firm’s target leverage and its deviation needs to be elucidated. A firm’s target leverage 
ratio is not observable and therefore, a proxy is estimated by using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression and a Tobit model. First, the thesis uses an OLS regression with fixed effects 




and Bonfim (2014), to compare results. The panel data model controls for both firm (𝑓𝑖) and 
time fixed effects (𝜓𝑡). The estimation is described by the following equation: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔 𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑀/𝐵 𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽5 𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑝 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
( 1 ) 
Second, a Tobit model is often used for the prediction of target leverage (Harford et al., 2009; 
Hovakimian et al., 2001; Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Tao et al., 2017). The most common 
assumption of leverage is that its value lies between zero and one and hence, a Tobit regression 
can be the appropriate model to predict the target leverage. The Tobit regression is estimated 
using double censoring by censoring the leverage variable from above by the value of one and 
below by zero in line with Denis and McKeon (2012), Harford et al. (2009), Tao et. al. (2017) 
and Hovakimian et al. (2004).  
The estimation of the Tobit regression is described by the following equation: 




+ 𝛽5 𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 +   𝛽6𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑝 𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
( 2 ) 
To avoid potential endogeneity problems caused by unobserved factors which affect the 
variables and the leverage ratio, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year (Antão 
& Bonfim, 2014; Kayhan & Titman, 2004; Tao et al., 2017).  
Next the target leverage of all firms is computed by using the fitted values of the regression 
equation (1) above, where X represents the capital structure determinants:  
𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂? + ?̂?𝑋𝑖,𝑡  
( 3 ) 
Then, for each firm the deviation from its target is computed by subtracting the predicted target 
leverage from its actual leverage to determine the leverage deficit at the point of acquisition:  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 −  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  




As the acquisition year, the completion date is used in the thesis, because the change in leverage 
would be caused at the time of effective date rather than at the announcement date, which can 
occur in another year than the completion date. 
To measure the adjustment of firms towards target leverage ratio to address hypothesis 2, 
previous papers use partial adjustment models (e.g. Antão & Bonfim, 2014; Faulkender et al., 
2012; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Khoo et al., 2017). The second step of the thesis’ model is a 
partial adjustment model based on the model proposed by Antão and Bonfim (2014) including 
firm (𝑓𝑖) and time fixed effects (𝜓𝑡):  




 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
( 5 )  
The variable “adjust” represents the adjustment of leverage towards target ratio:  
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  −  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 
( 6 ) 
Profitability, as defined earlier, is included to account for short-term cash flow variations, as 
well as a variable focused on investments to capture movements, which would cause firms to 
move further away from their target in short-term (Antão and Bonfim, 2014; Fama & French, 
2002). The investment variable is measured as capital expenditure scaled by total assets. 
 
4. Data  
4.1 Sample of Acquisitions  
 
The thesis requires five years of post-acquisition data to study the leverage adjustment 
following Harford et al. (2009), and therefore focuses on acquisitions, which have been 
announced and completed between January 1993 and December 2012. The deal scanner of 
Thomson Reuters Eikon is used to obtain mergers and acquisitions of public firms located in 
the United States. Based on previous capital structure research, the sample excludes utilities 
and financial firms (Fama & French, 2002; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Uysal, 2011), as well as 




structure may be influenced by special factors differing from other industrial and service firms. 
To test the hypotheses referring to the payment method, the sample is reduced based on the 
three main consideration structures: cash only, stock only and cash and stock combination. 
Furthermore, the sample considers only large acquisitions as in Harford et al. (2009) by 
requiring that the target firm’s total assets account for at least 10% of the acquirer’s total assets. 
The exclusion of smaller acquisition supports the assumption for the second hypothesis that the 
acquisition changes the acquirer’s capital structure to analyse if firms converge back to their 
target ratio. In addition, only firms which can be clearly assigned to Compustat’s Gvkey 
identification to obtain the firm specific data are considered. After obtaining the Compustat 
data through the Gvkey, further exclusions are completed by removing acquirers belonging to 
the financial or utilities industry according to the SIC code classification (SIC codes 6000 – 
6999 and 4900 – 4999). Moreover, firms which make several acquisitions in one year are 
excluded.  The exclusion is performed to ensure that the annual variables reflect the time of 
acquiring a firm to measure the leverage deficit. The final sample amounts to 1,290 acquisitions 
and mergers completed by 1,043 firms, accounting for both single and multiple time acquirers. 
 
 Table 2: Characteristics of Deals from 1993 to 2012  
  
Year Number of Acquisitions Fraction of Sample 
    Cash and Stock Combination Cash Only Stock Only 
1993 26 0.27 0.46 0.27 
1994 62 0.39 0.40 0.21 
1995 62 0.18 0.35 0.47 
1996 66 0.20 0.32 0.48 
1997 103 0.24 0.37 0.39 
1998 109 0.28 0.45 0.28 
1999 107 0.32 0.30 0.38 
2000 101 0.23 0.29 0.49 
2001 75 0.35 0.23 0.43 
2002 51 0.37 0.27 0.35 
2003 50 0.30 0.58 0.12 
2004 56 0.38 0.38 0.25 
2005 52 0.40 0.38 0.21 
2006 81 0.33 0.58 0.09 
2007 73 0.25 0.59 0.16 
2008 49 0.37 0.55 0.08 
2009 26 0.31 0.42 0.27 
2010 50 0.32 0.54 0.14 
2011 40 0.45 0.53 0.03 
2012 51 0.31 0.63 0.06 
     




By studying the data on large acquisitions over the twenty years, several observations can be 
made. Firstly, the number of acquisitions has been almost continuously increasing since 1993, 
reaching a maximum number of acquisitions in 1998 (109 transactions). After 1998, the number 
of acquisitions declined to 50 acquisitions in 2003. In the years before the financial crisis the 
number of transactions increased again with 81 acquisitions in 2006, and 73 transactions in 
2007. A general decline can be identified for the years after 2007 up to 2012.  
Regarding the method of payment, it can be observed that in the latest years from 2006 to 2012, 
cash only was the preferred method. Considering the whole sample, the preference between 
stock only (363) and stock and cash combination (390) is almost equal with around 30%, 
whereas cash was chosen in 42% (537) of the transactions. Regarding the form of the deal, the 
majority of the transactions are completed as mergers (71%). The majority of the sample’s 
acquirers are acquiring only one firm during the time frame. Further characteristics of the 
transactions and acquirers can be found in the Appendix 2 and 3. 
To further describe the sample of acquirers, Table 3 summarizes the main variables of the 1,043 
firms from 1992 to 2017 that make acquisitions in the defined period. The outliers of the 
following variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile level.  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics – Acquisition Sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean p50 p25 p75 Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Market Lev. 15,336  0.33     0.29     0.14     0.47     0.23    -0.11     0.99    
Book Lev. 16,099  0.48     0.46     0.29     0.62     0.66    -1.86     20.38    
Firm Size 17,068  6.05     6.17     4.60     7.59     2.23    -3.27     10.71    
Profitability 17,134  0.06     0.12     0.06     0.17     0.39    -11.74     0.43    
Tangibility 17,186  0.25     0.18     0.08     0.35     0.22     -       0.92    
Market/Book  15,336  2.22     1.53     1.13     2.29     3.89     0.25     156.29    
R&D dummy 17,490  0.62     1.00     -       1.00     0.49     -       1.00    
Selling Exp. 15,832  0.38     0.25     0.14     0.41     0.89     0.02     20.60    
Depreciation 17,134  0.05     0.04     0.03     0.06     0.04     -       0.33    
 
4.2 Prediction Data  
 
To estimate the target leverage ratio, the thesis uses annual fundamentals data of firms recorded 




applying the model of equation (1) and (2). The fitted values of the regressions are then used to 
predict the target leverage ratio of the firms of the acquisition sample.  
As discussed, firms which belong to the financial or utilities industry according to the SIC code 
classification (SIC codes 6000 – 6999 and 4900 – 4999) are excluded. As in the acquisition 
sample, the main variables of the prediction data are winsorized.  The final data sample amounts 
to 175,536 observations of 17,496 firms. Table 4 represent the summary statistics of the 
prediction data according to the main determinants of leverage as defined in Section 3.2.  
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics – Prediction Data 
 
Variable Obs. Mean p50 p25 p75 Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Lev. 138,444 0.34 0.28 0.12 0.52 0.27 -0.11 0.99 
Book Lev. 157,473 0.83 0.47 0.25 0.69 2.37 -1.86 20.38 
Firm Size 155,334 4.72 4.87 2.97 6.68 2.83 -3.27 10.71 
Profitability 163,493 -0.25 0.09 -0.08 0.15 1.47 -11.74 0.43 
Tangibility 164,691 0.26 0.18 0.07 0.39 0.24 0.00 0.92 
Market/Book 137,756 5.09 1.55 1.07 2.73 17.99 0.25 156.29 
R&D dummy 175,536 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Selling Exp. 138,850 0.79 0.27 0.15 0.49 2.48 0.02 20.60 
Depreciation 163,488 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.33 
 
To further describe the data before estimating the model, Table 5 shows the pairwise correlation 
between the main variables and their significance level. The results of the correlation matrix 
coincide with the expected relationship of the previously introduced research. The expected 
correlation between leverage and profitability, which was not clear earlier, is positive, yet, the 
correlation is rather low. The strongest correlation with leverage according to the sample is seen 
for size and tangibility. All correlations are significant at the 1% significance level, as indicated.   
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix – Prediction Data 
 
  Mar. Lev. Size Profit Tan M/B R&D dum. SellEx Dep 
Mar. Lev. 1        
Size 0.187** 1       
Profit 0.024** 0.424** 1      
Tan 0.206** 0.161** 0.088** 1     
M/B -0.115** -0.300** -0.747** -0.079** 1    
R&D dum. -0.149** -0.057** 0.076** -0.233** -0.092** 1   
SellExp. -0.108** -0.473** -0.527** -0.084** 0.369** 0.065** 1  
Dep 0.145** -0.101** -0.177** 0.324** 0.092** -0.032** 0.049** 1 




5. Empirical Analysis and Results  
5.1 Analysis of Determinants of Capital Structure  
 
As described in section 3.3 the thesis predicts the target leverage ratio with OLS regression and 
a Tobit model. Table 6 shows the OLS estimates of the equation (1) for both market and book 
leverage with using a fixed effect model and robust standard errors.  
 
Table 6: OLS Regressions – Target Leverage 
 
 Dependent variable:  Market Leverage Book Leverage 
     
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Size 0.028** 0.000 -0.112** 0.000 
Profit -0.033** 0.000 -0.510** 0.000 
Tangibility 0.125** 0.000 -0.185 0.104 
R&D dummy -0.013* 0.025 -0.186** 0.000 
M/B Ratio -0.003** 0.000 0.012** 0.001 
Sell. Expense 0.001 0.437 -0.034** 0.003 
Depreciation 0.361** 0.000 2.844** 0.000 
Constant  0.133** 0.000 0.964** 0.000 
     
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  
     
Number of Observations 102,526  102,860  
Number of Groups  12,494  12,528  
     
R square:     
Within 0.115  0.114  
between  0.077  0.430  
Overall 0.080  0.287  
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. 
Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. 
 
By analysing the regression on market leverage, it can be concluded that all the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level, except the R&D dummy variable and the 
variable selling expense. While selling expense has no significant effect, the R&D variable 
shows a negative effect on market leverage at the 5% significance level.  In comparison with 
Table 1, it can be seen that profitability has a negative coefficient, which is consistent with 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2003), for 
instance. Fama and French (2002) explain the negative relationship as support for the pecking 
order, yet, leverage reduction can also be explained more mechanically – “When a firm earns 




of the coefficients on size are coherent with e.g. Harford et. al (2009), Kayhan & Titman (2004). 
The positive relationship of asset tangibility and leverage coincides with previous research such 
as Frank & Goyal (2003) and Harford et. al (2009). In addition, the estimated negative effect 
of the R&D dummy is consistent with the assumption that firm with R&D spending have lower 
leverage as in Flanner & Ragan (2006) and Hovakimian et al. (2001).  Also, the effect of the 
market to book ratio reflects the results of e.g. Flannery & Ragan (2006) and Khoo et al. (2017). 
In contrast, depreciations show a significant positive relationship for both market and book 
leverage, although depreciation was assumed to be negative. Therefore, the results cannot 
confirm that higher depreciation expense as tax shields provide the need to reduce debt.  
The coefficients obtained by using book leverage as a dependent variable show a significance 
at the 1% level with exception of tangibility. Comparing the signs of the coefficients to Table 
1, firm size was found to be negative and therefore, the results are inconsistent with the 
assumption that larger firms operate with more leverage as they have easier access to debt 
markets because they are more diversified and transparent. Furthermore, tangibility has 
opposite signs as expected with reference to e.g. Frank & Goyal (2003). The assumption that 
firms with more tangible assets have higher leverage, e.g. Frank & Goyal (2003), could not be 
confirmed by the regressions on book leverage. Also, the M/B ratio has opposite signs in 
comparison with Flannery & Ragan (2006) and Khoo et al. (2017).  
In addition to estimating the predictors of leverage trough an OLS regression with fixed effect, 
the thesis uses a censored Tobit regression following equation (2). The upper limit is defined 












Table 7: Tobit Regressions – Target Leverage 
 
 Dependent variable:  Market Leverage Book Leverage 
          
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Size 0.029** 0.000 0.019** 0.000 
Profit -0.039** 0.000 -0.074** 0.000 
Tangibility 0.114** 0.000 0.061** 0.000 
R&D dummy -0.039** 0.000 -0.028** 0.000 
M/B Ratio -0.003** 0.000 -0.0003* 0.039 
Sell. Expense 0.001** 0.006 0.001** 0.005 
Depreciation 0.408** 0.000 0.740** 0.000 
Constant  0.222** 0.000 0.386** 0.000 
          
Random Effect Yes   Yes   
          
Number of Observations 102,586   102,920   
Uncensored 101,353   93,257  
Left censored 1,233   1,717  
Right censored  0   7,946  
Number of Groups 12,496  12,530  
         
Log likelihood 22454.94  4318.26   
Wald chi2(7) 6749.42  5743.41   
Prob >chi2 0   0   
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. 
 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the Tobit regression is that the signs of the 
coefficients are robust for both market and book leverage. In addition, all variables are 
statistically significant at the 5% or 1% significance level. Comparing it to the expected effects 
as discussed earlier (Table 1), it can be seen that the variables size, profit, tangibility, M/B ratio, 
and R&D are consistent with previous research. Selling expense seems to increase leverage 
although slightly in contrast to the assumption that firms with more unique products have less 
leverage (e.g. Hovakimian et al., 2004).  The Tobit regression show the result of a positive 
effect of depreciation on leverage coherent with the OLS regression.  
 
5.2 Predicted Leverage and Deviation of Acquirers  
 
The analysis proceeds with the estimation of the predicted leverage and the deviation of 
acquiring firms by using the fitted values of the previous regressions, as described in equation 
(2). Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the predicted target leverage of the 1,043 firms 




Table 8: Summary Statistic of Predicted Leverage 
 
Panel A: OLS Regression 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Book Leverage 13,260 0.465 0.316 -0.444 3.736 
Market Leverage 13,260 0.404 0.083 -0.204 0.746 
Panel B: Tobit regression 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Book Leverage 13,260 0.523 0.069 0.337 0.945 
Market Leverage 13,260 0.406 0.095 -0.248 0.701 
 
As concluded earlier, most of the capital structure determinants attained through the Tobit 
regression are in line with previous studies, whereas the OLS regression shows more 
divergences. Moreover, the Tobit regression resulted in fewer outliers and therefore, the main 
analysis is primarily continued with the target leverage of the Tobit regression.  
Succeeding the prediction, the deviation is estimated (Equation 3). Table 9 displays the leverage 
deviation of the pre-acquisition year. While, the year of completion is considered as the year of 
acquisition. Regarding book leverage, the deviation from target amounts to an average of 0.08 
for cash acquisitions, whereas the stock acquisitions amount to only 0.05, which could indicate 
a preference. Yet, considering market leverage, the deviation accounts to 0.083, on average, for 
cash transactions, while acquisitions completed by stock have a deviation of 0.076, on average. 
 
Table 9: Leverage Deviation 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Panel A: Acquisition made by Cash Only 
 Book Leverage  375 0.076 0.217 -0.947 0.642 
 Market Leverage  375 0.083 0.213 -0.680 0.499 
Panel B: Acquisition made by Cash and Stock Combination 
 Book Leverage  283 0.061 0.297 -2.315 1.573 
 Market Leverage  282 0.057 0.223 -0.711 0.419 
Panel C: Acquisition made by Stock only 
 Book Leverage  252 0.048 0.272 -1.948 1.364 
 Market Leverage  252 0.076 0.216 -0.603 0.510 
Panel D: Non-Acquisition Observations 
 Book Leverage  11,206 0.050 0.305 -12.039 2.492 
 Market Leverage  11,197 0.074 0.209 - 0.762 0.606 
Panel E: Entire Sample 
 Book Leverage  12,116 0.051 0.302 -12.039 2.492 
 Market Leverage  12,106 0.074 0.210 -0.762 0.606 





Overall, the average leverage deviation is higher for cash payments than for stock payments, 
which could indicate that firms with more overleverage prefer cash payments. However, the 
table does not show statistical significances between the payment groups and therefore further 
analysis is needed. The next section uses a logit model to predict the payment form.   
Appendix 4 shows the leverage deviation based on the SIC industry groups. By measuring book 
leverage, the largest average deviation was found in the industry group business equipment 
through measuring book leverage, whereas the highest deviation of market leverage was found 
in the manufacturing industry. Taking into account the entire sample, it can be observed that 
the average leverage deviation of book leverage is smaller (0.051) than the market leverage 
variance (0.074), which could indicate that firms are balancing the book leverage more actively.  
 
5.3 Acquirer’s Choice of Payment   
 
To analyse the trade-off theory in the context of merger and acquisitions, this section focuses 
on Hypothesis 1 and therefore, it is tested whether a bidder’s deviation from its target ratio 
influences the choice of payment used for the transaction. Consequently, the dependent variable 
is a dummy variable based on the payment, which can be stock, cash only or a stock and cash 
combination. The dependent variable takes a binary form; hence, the regressions follow a logit 
model with robust standard errors. The included control variables aim on capturing other 
factors, which can influence the payment choice such as the relative deal value to the bidder’s 
assets, pre-acquisition cash holdings and profitability. Furthermore, firm size is included 
because larger firms can have easier access to the debt market due to diversification (Kayhan 
& Titman, 2004), which allows them to acquire financing for cash acquisition. In addition, the 
market to book ratio is included to account growth opportunities, while taxes scaled by total 
assets capture the interest tax shields. Table 10 and 11 show the regression results for cash only 
and stock only payment using market leverage. For robustness, the results for book leverage 
are presented in the Appendix 6 and 7.  The four variables focused on the leverage deviations 
pre-acquisition are based on (Harford, Klasa, & Walcott, 2006). The first model includes the 
variables leverage deviation in the year before the merger, while the second model includes the 
change in deviation as a variable. According to Harford et al. (2009), “bidders with greater 
investment opportunities are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems as a result 
of having too high a debt load, they could be more likely to give importance to maintaining 




variables multiplied with the market to book ratio to account for growth opportunities following 
Harford et al. (2009).  
 
Table 10: Predicting Cash Acquisitions – Market Leverage 
       
Dependent Variable: Cash only = 1         
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation 0.758*   0.682   
  (0.050)   (0.220)  
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B  0.079  
     (0.846)  
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation   1.025    0.889 
    (0.123)    (0.189) 
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B     0.125  
        (0.399) 
Cash/Total Assetst-1 0.542 0.784 0.556 0.883 
  (0.359) (0.212) (0.351) (0.169) 
Tax/Total Assetst-1 1.360 0.845 1.379 1.260 
  (0.663) (0.794) (0.659) (0.701) 
Market/Book Ratiot-1  0.014 0.015 -0.012 -0.034 
  (0.115) (0.114) (0.932) (0.620) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assetst-1 0.0005 0.0005* 0.0005 0.001* 
  (0.068) (0.043) (0.070) (0.047) 
Profitabilityt-1 -1.840** -1.678* -1.834** -1.573* 
  (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.025) 
Firm Sizet-1 0.025 0.050 0.024 0.050 
  (0.520) (0.216) (0.536) (0.222) 
Constant -0.510 -0.699* -0.474 -0.638* 
  (0.065) (0.017) (0.148) (0.035) 
       
Pseudo R2  0.014 0.012 0.014 0.013 
Number of observations  847 761 847 761 
Log pseudolikelihood -564.551 -505.086 -564.534 -504.780 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon 
Harford et al. (2006).  
 
The regression results showed that there is a positive correlation between leverage deviation 
and cash payment, however, the relationship is not consistently significant in the four models.  
The models accounting for growth opportunities do not support the claim that bidders with 
higher growth opportunities are more likely to use cash due to the underinvestment issue as in 
Harford et al. (2009). Only the variable that considers the leverage deviation of the pre-merger 
year has a significance level of 5%. For a firm deciding to use cash as payment method, the 




coefficients of leverage deviation indicate that a firm does not consider the opportunity of a 
merger to adjust towards its target leverage ratio, which would support the target leverage 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the probability of a firm paying the acquisition with cash only 
is negatively associated with profitability, which suggest that firms consider the interest tax 
shield of issuing debt to finance the acquisition with cash. Furthermore, the cash ratio of a firm 
does not have a significant effect on the cash payment method, whereas the deal value has a 
significant positive correlation in the two regressions, which include the pre-acquisition year 
change as an explanatory variable. In addition to analysing the factors of cash payment, the 
regressions in Table 11 predict stock mergers.  
 
Table 11: Predicting Stock Acquisitions – Market Leverage 
     
Dependent Variable: Stock only = 1         
         
 Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation  -0.040    -0.774   
  (0.924)   (0.241)    
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B    -0.761    
     (0.081)    
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation   -0.355  1.094  
    (0.619)   (0.398)  
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B       -1.020 
        (0.149) 
Cash/Total Assets -1.345 -0.921 -1.515* -1.12 
  (0.053) (0.211) (0.035) (0.139) 
Tax/Total Assets -1.778 -0.781 -1.983 -1.400 
  (0.621) (0.841) (0.582) (0.719) 
Market/Book Ratio  -0.010 -0.007 0.232 0.080 
  (0.380) (0.498) (0.103) (0.257) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.419) (0.313) (0.461) (0.579) 
Profitability 1.665 1.530 1.600 1.213 
  (0.089) (0.149) (0.087) (0.225) 
Firm Size 0.007 0.029 0.015 0.026 
  (0.869) (0.532) (0.087) (0.579) 
Constant -1.023** -1.237** -1.346** -1.280** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Pseudo R2  0.012 0.010 0.011 0.013 
Number of observations  847 761 847 761 
Log pseudolikelihood -489.362 -438.942 -488.103 -437.574 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. Regressions estimated with robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit 





In contrast to the regressions predicting cash acquisition, none of the variables is significant for 
predicting stock acquisitions. Therefore, it is concluded that leverage deviation does not 
significantly influence firms to make an acquisition paid with stock only, according to the 
sample.  Also, the same regressions are performed for the stock and cash combination in 
Appendix 5. Addressing the leverage deviation, only the pre-acquisition leverage deviation is 
significantly negatively correlated with the mixed payment method. To further analyse and 
subsequently compare with results of the literature, Table 12 shows the cash predictions using 
the target leverage estimated by the Tobit and by the OLS regression with fixed effect.  
 
Table 12: Predicting Cash Acquisitions – Tobit & OLS Regression 
 
  Tobit Regression OLS Regression 
Dependent Variable:  









     
Pre-acquisition leverage deviation 0.783* 0.456 0.793 0.122 
 (0.042) (0.158) (0.063) (0.552) 
Cash/Total Assets 0.430 0.530 0.275 0.524 
 (0.446) (0.344) (0.665) (0.408) 
Tax/Total Assets 1.177 2.062 -5.430 -4.325 
 (0.703) (0.490) (0.073) (0.145) 
Market/Book Ratio 0.014 0.018 -0.019 0.000 
 (0.137) (0.071) (0.658) (0.988) 
Deal Value/ pre-acq. Total Assets 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.094) (0.105) (0.232) (0.237) 
Profitability -1.719* -1.407* 0.265 0.522 
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.662) (0.447) 
Constant -0.351** -0.397** -0.263* -0.315* 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.068) (0.021) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.012 0.008 0.012 
Number of observations 847 847 856 856 
Log pseudolikelihood -564.753 -565.830 -493.190 -573.738 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level.  Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. P-value in parenthesis. 
 
Considering the OLS regression, none of the variables are significant in neither book or market 
leverage. For the Tobit regression, it is shown that the negative coefficient associated with 
profitability to cash payment holds true for both market and book leverage. For stock 
acquisitions predicted with book leverage deviations, none of the variables are significant, 
which is the same result as with market leverage. Therefore, it is concluded that leverage 




et al. (2009), that firms with higher leverage than their target ratio “[..] prefer to finance the 
merger with equity rather than debt” (p. 8), cannot be confirmed with the present sample of 
large acquisitions. The thesis found a positive correlation of pre-merger leverage deviation to 
cash payment consistent with Harford et. al (2009). Although Harford et al. (2009) state a 
negative association, the relationship found in the present study is coherent due to the fact that 
the authors compute the deviation by subtracting the predicted leverage from the actual value, 
while the thesis computes the deviation in the opposite way. Harford et al. (2009) also found 
the variable pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation to be significant for predicting 
cash acquisition, which is not proven in the present study. One reason for the divergence can 
be the defined acquisition year, while the thesis uses the completion date, Harford et al. (2009) 
use the announcement date. 
The results of the thesis indicate that bidders which are overleveraged in comparison to their 
target ratio are less likely to pay for the acquisition with cash. According to Uysal (2011), most 
cash acquisitions are financed with debt, in reference to Harford et al. (2009) and Bharadwaj 
and Shivdasani (2003). Consequently, it can be concluded that firms with overleverage are less 
likely to finance their acquisition with debt, consistent with Uysal (2011) and Harford et al. 
(2009). In view of predicting mixed payment acquisition, a negative effect on leverage 
deviation was obtained, which suggests that overleveraged firms are more likely to use a mixed 
payment method. One could conclude that, in turn, overleveraged firms in return are more likely 
to use stock as consideration structure. However, the regressions on stock only resulted in non-
significant results. Addressing the first hypothesis, the conclusion of the thesis is that bidders, 
which are above their target leverage ratio, are less likely to finance their transaction with debt, 
but it is not proven that they are more likely to finance the transaction with equity instead. 
Rather, overleveraged firms are more likely to use a mixed payment method.  
 
5.4 Merger-induced Leverage Changes and Evolution 
 
The next two sections focus on Hypothesis 2 by testing if firms increase their leverage deviation 
with an acquisition and if they adjust towards leverage ratio after the acquisition is completed. 
The first analysis of Table 13 aims to explain the leverage changes associated by the mergers. 
Unless indicated otherwise, the target leverage is determined by the predictions of the Tobit 
model for the succeeding analyses.  It is assumed that firms, which are engaging in mergers are 
likely to change their leverage ratio due to the financing of a large target. The thesis focuses 




leverage. At the same time the leverage ratio is expected to change, it is very likely the target 
is changed as well. Hence, the following model includes a variable called merger-induced 
change based on Harford et al. (2009). The merger-induced change captures the change in target 
from the pre-acquisition year to the effective acquisition year (Harford et al, 2009). Thereby, it 
can be tested if firms consider their future target ratio of the combined firm and if the leverage 
increases due to the transaction.   
Following Harford et al. (2006), Table 13 uses the four variables of leverage deviation and the 
control variables as in Tables 10 and 11. The dependent variable in scope is the actual leverage 
in the first post-acquisition year subtracted by the year prior the merger. The regressions aim to 
determine whether bidders consider the target ratio of the combined firm in the financing 
decision and whether the financing decision leads to a leverage increase (Harford et al., 2009).   
 
Table 13: Explaning Leverage Change of Acquistion – Market Leverage 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Leverage in the year following the merger minus leverage in the year prior to the merger  
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation 0.284**  0.402**    
  (0.000)   (0.000)    
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B   -0.108*    
    (0.045)    
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation  0.192*  0.173 
   (0.015)   (0.146) 
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B      0.013 
       (0.728) 
Merger-induced change in target leverage 1.257** 1.387** 1.332** 1.400** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash/Total Assetst-1 -0.019 0.095 -0.031 0.097 
  (0.679) (0.063) (0.507) (0.061) 
Tax/Total Assetst-1 -0.414 -0.060 -0.436 -0.054 
  (0.069) (0.816) (0.051) (0.834) 
Market/Book Ratiot-1 -0.001 0.006 0.028 0.006 
  (0.744) (0.093) (0.073) (0.245) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitabilityt-1 0.121 0.284** 0.126 0.287** 
  (0.054) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) 
Firm Size -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
  (0.124) (0.959) (0.200) (0.982) 
Constant 0.009 -0.050 -0.028 -0.054 
  (0.723) (0.072) (0.383)  (0.058) 
          
R squared 0.189 0.118 0.200 0.118 
Number of observations  756 675 756 675 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon Harford et 






In line with the results of Harford et al. (2009), the thesis finds a significant positive relation 
between the merger-induced change and the bidder’s leverage levels. The merger-induced 
change is significant at the 1% significance level for all four ordinary least squares models. The 
results suggest that managers are more likely to complete and finance a merger, which increase 
their firm’s leverage, if the transaction increases also the predicted target leverage ratio at the 
same time. The dimension of the coefficient of the merger- induced change variable accentuates 
the importance of the leverage adjustment and hence, that managers actively adjust their firm’s 
leverage towards target.  
Furthermore, the results show that the change in actual leverage associated with the merger is 
significantly and positively correlated with pre-acquisition year leverage deviation and the pre-
acquisition change in leverage deviation. It can be concluded that bidders’ managers are “less 
likely to structure an acquisition transaction which significantly increases book leverage the 
more a firm is already over its target leverage” (Harford et al, 2006, p. 25). Harford et al. (2009) 
reported that “[..] if the pre-acquisition year leverage deviation per dollar of assets is ten cents 
higher, the merger-induced change in market leverage is reduced by approximately 3.4 cents 
per dollar of assets.” (p. 9). The present study shows that the raise of ten cents per dollar in pre-
acquisition year leverage deviation leads to an increase by 2.8 cents in the merger-induced 
change in market leverage. Consequently, the results are very similar to the earlier study by 
Harford et al. and extending the sample of large acquisitions through including the financial 
crisis and the five years succeeding does not change the main conclusions that managers make 
financing decisions towards target leverage ratio.  
The third and fourth column in Table 13 includes variables multiplied by the market to book 
ratio. A significant and negative coefficient is found on pre-acquisition year in leverage 
deviation*M/B variable. The increase of pre-acquisition year leverage deviation by ten cents 
per dollar increases the merger-induced change in market leverage by 4.0 cents in the third 
model. This could suggest that firms with greater growth opportunities take more advantage of 
a merger-induced leverage change to adjust towards target. Overall, the results of the model 





To further analyse the leverage deviation induced by the merger, Table 14 shows the mean 
statistics of market leverage deviation over time, grouped by the consideration structure. The 
period is defined as two years prior to five years after the effective acquisition year.  
 
Table 14: Mean of Market Leverage Deviation over Time 
               
Years -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: All Observations 
Mean  0.066 0.073 0.064 0.073 0.072 0.063 0.056 0.058 
Number Obs.  830 909 966 953 916 866 829 774 
Panel B: Cash Only 
Mean 0.067 0.083 0.076 0.076 0.072 0.05 0.037* 0.05 
Number Obs.  331 375 398 395 384 366 354 328 
p-value (0.907) (0.244) (0.178) (0.781) (0.959) (0.16) (0.037) (0.366) 
Panel C: Stock Only 
Mean 0.077 0.076 0.062 0.07 0.077 0.09 0.085* 0.083 
Number Obs.  231 252 274 266 249 235 225 208 
p-value (0.349) (0.813) (0.879) (0.729) (0.647) (0.09) (0.025) (0.054) 
Panel D: Cash and Stock Combination   
Mean 0.055 0.057 0.05 0.074 0.068 0.056 0.057 0.048 
Number Obs.  268 282 294 292 283 265 250 238 
p-value (0.308) (0.142) (0.196) (0.968) (0.699) (0.569) (0.933) (0.377) 
Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A in Table 14 shows that the mean of the deviation of all acquisition is 0.073 in the year 
prior to the merger. Overall, the means show that the majority of the sample is underleveraged 
at any point of the observation period. It is observed that the highest average leverage deviation 
is found at the cash sample in Panel B. The leverage deviation of cash acquirer amounts to 8.3 
cents per dollar of assets, while the cash and stock combination deviated by 5.7 cents per dollar 
of assets.  For cash acquisition, the average deviation is reduced to 3.7 cents per dollar of assets 
in the fourth year after the acquisition completion, whereas the stock acquisition sample 
increases the deviation to 8.5 cents in the same time frame. Looking at the mixed payment 
acquisition sample, the deviation tends to be lower than the deviation of the other two payment 
groups over the observed period. The analysis of Table 14 supports the earlier conclusion that 
managers of cash acquisition consider the leverage deviation in their financing choice and they 







5.5 Leverage Adjustment  
 
Hypothesis 2 also focuses on firms’ adjustment towards target ratio and therefore, the partial 
adjustment model as described in equation (4) with fixed effects, is applied. Table 16 shows the 
adjustment model, based on the whole sample of firms without specifically addressing the 
acquisition year. The dependent variable is the change in leverage by computing leverage 
subtracted by the lagged leverage. The explanatory variables aim to capture short-term 
movements away from the target capital structure.  
 
Table 15: Adjustment Model 
 







   
Adjust  0.385** (0.00) 0.437**(0.000) 
∆ Profitability t -0.136** (0.000) -0.204*(0.046) 
∆ Profitability t-1 -0.033 **(0.008) -0.083 (0.068) 
Investment -0.122** (0.002) 0.016 (0.804) 
Investment t-1 0.0367 (0.235) -0.040 (0.541) 
Constant 0.024** (0.000) 0.018** (0.008) 
    
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
    
Number of Observations 12,293 12,299 
Number of Groups  998 998 
    
R square:   
Within 0.339 0.224 
between  0.013 0.067 
Overall 0.188 0.131 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Regressions  
are estimated with robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model.  
P-value in parenthesis. 
    
The adjustment variable has a significant coefficient at the 1% significance level for both 
market and book leverage. Considering market leverage, firms adjust their leverage towards 
target by approximately 39% every year, while the book leverage adjustment amounts to 
roughly 44%. Therefore, the results provide evidence for the assumption that firms adjust 
towards target ratio, and thereby support the trade-off theory hypothesis. The results of the 
adjustment model are in line with previous research, such as the studies of Flannery and Rangan 




adjustment rate of the present model is close to the adjustment speed of Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), who estimated a speed of approximately 36% using market leverage and 34% with book 
leverage. It is also similar to the result of Antoniou et al. (2008) of 32.2% for market leverage. 
In contrast, Ritter and Huang report a slower speed of 16% per year for book leverage using 
firm fixed effects, while the adjustment speed of market leverage is approximately 14%. 
Authors which do not use fixed effects, estimate lower speed of adjustment such as Kayhan and 
Titman (2004), who obtain 10% for book leverage and 8% for market leverage.  
In addition, the thesis specifically focuses on the adjustment after the merger; thus, Table 16 
focuses on the adjustment post-merger. Also, in the context of leverage adjustment, it is crucial 
to address adjustment costs. As pointed out by Flannery and Ragan (2006),  
“The speed with which firms reverse deviations from their target debt ratios depends on 
the cost of adjusting leverage. With zero adjustment costs, the trade-off theory implies 
that firms should never deviate from their optimal leverage.” (p. 470).  
Thus, the following model includes bankruptcy risk as an explanatory variable following Leary 
and Roberts (2005), Harford et al. (2009) and Tao et. al. (2017).  Bankruptcy risk is thus a 
measure of adjustment cost. Following Harford et al. (2009) based on Graham (1996), this 
thesis uses a modified unlevered version of the Altman-Z score. The bankruptcy risk variable 
is computed through:  computed through (total assets)/ (3.3 times earnings before interest and 
taxes + sales + 1.4 times retained earnings + 1.2 times working capital). Table 16 below displays 
a model based on Harford et al. (2009), which includes bankruptcy risk. The dependent variable 
is the change in leverage deviation from year zero to year three, four and five. The leverage 
deviation is estimated through predicted leverage of the Tobit model subtracted by the actual 

















Year 0 to +3 
∆Leverage deviation 
Year 0 to +4 
∆Leverage deviation 
Year 0 to +5 
       
Acquisition year deviation    -0.382**  -0.479**  -0.465** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Acquisition year leverage    -0.005  -0.016  0.039 
  (0.966)  (0.898)  (0.768) 
Pre-acquisition year deviation -0.265*  -0.386*  -0.377**  
 (0.029)  (0.005)  (0.009)  
Pre-acquisition year leverage -0.007  -0.083  -0.088  
 (0.948)  (0.507)  (0.519)  
Sizet-1 0.007 0.010 0.014* 0.017** 0.015* 0.015* 
 (0.208) (0.054) (0.015) (0.002) (0.023) (0.010) 
Profitt-1 -0.048 -0.045 -0.042 -0.035 -0.024 -0.009 
 (0.273) (0.231) (0.347) (0.386) (0.547) (0.801) 
Bankruptcy riskt-1 0.002 0.001** 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 
 (0.062) (0.004) (0.463) (0.802) (0.113) (0.954) 
Cash/ Total Assetst-1 0.085 0.124* 0.157* 0.214** 0.094 0.210** 
 (0.183) (0.028) (0.020) (0.000) (0.188) (0.001) 
Taxes/ Total Assetst-1 0.591* 0.630** 0.302 0.411 -0.060 0.078 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.338) (0.152) (0.862) (0.830) 
Market/Book Ratiot-1 0.004** 0.002** 0.003** 0.001** 0.004** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002) 
Constant -0.060 -0.071 -0.072 -0.110* -0.071 -0.122** 
 (0.121) (0.051) (0.128) (0.015) (0.151) (0.008) 
       
Number of obs. 609 664 563 616 519 568 
R square 0.088 0.171 0.100 0.212 0.205 0.225 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon Harford et 
al. (2006).  
 
 
The regressions showed a significant negative association of the pre-acquisition year leverage 
deviation to the dependent variable for all three periods. This result indicates that the bidder 
reduces its leverage more towards the target in the years following the merger, when the pre-
acquisition leverage deviation is higher. The bankruptcy risk is not significant in five of the six 
regressions, contradicting the trade-off theory, which proposes that firms balance bankruptcy 
costs against tax benefits of debt, yet, the tax variable is significant for the first two models.  
Considering the pre-acquisition market to book ratio, there is a negative correlation with change 
in the acquirer’s deviation, which suggests that acquirers are more likely to move towards target 




acquisition year leverage deviation variable suggests that about 47% of an acquirer’s leverage 
deviation is reversed after five years. In comparison, Harford et al.  estimated a reversal of 54% 
for cash deals.  
 
5.6 Analysis Pre- and Post-financial Crisis  
 
The last part of the analysis emphasises the results in the context of the financial crisis.  The 
papers of Uysal (2007) and Harford (2009), which were taken into account for the construction 
of the thesis, focus on acquisitions before the financial crisis of 2008. The thesis extends the 
sample until 2012 and therefore includes acquisitions made during the financial crisis and in 
the post-financial crisis years. The thesis divides the sample into pre-financial crisis, with 
observations before 2008, and post-financial crisis, with observations from 2008 to 2012. Table 
17 follows the same model as Table 15 but estimates the model separately for both samples.  
 
Table 17: Adjustment Model – Pre- and Post-Financial Crisis 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆ Leverage 
  Pre-financial crisis Post-financial crisis 
  Market Lev. Book Lev. Market Lev. Book Lev. 
       
Adjust  0.467** 0.538** 0.490** 0.372** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ Profitability t -0.144** -0.178** -0.130** -0.251** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ Profitability t-1 -0.038** -0.087** -0.032** -0.123** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Investment -0.144** 0.022 -0.158** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.747) (0.001) (0.988) 
Investment t-1 0.005 -0.069 0.005 0.031 
  (0.855) (0.247) (0.900) (0.544) 
Constant -0.029** -0.035** 0.087** 0.010 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.068) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Number of Observations 8,101 8,101 4,198 4,198 
Number of Groups  955 955 595 595 
          
R square:       
Within 0.327 0.248 0.486 0.296 
between  0.022 0.068 0.039 0.119 
Overall 0.144 0.137 0.227 0.119 
    The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Target leverage  




Considering market leverage, the adjustment speed is about 10% higher than the adjusted speed 
of Table 15. The adjustment speed for market leverage amounts to 47% in the pre-financial 
crisis, while the post-financial crisis sample has a leverage adjustment speed towards target of 
49%. When the model is estimated with book leverage, the adjustment speeds diverge to a 
greater extent. While the model of Table 15 estimated an adjustment speed of 44%, the current 
model obtained a speed of 53% before the crisis and 37% after the crisis. Overall, it can be 
concluded that extending the sample with the financial crisis and five years after the crisis does 
not change the main conclusion that firms converge towards a target ratio. Rather, the 
adjustment speed increases for both samples.  
Furthermore, it is tested if the change of leverage towards target after the merger differs in the 
two groups. Table 18 follows the model of Table 16 by including a measure of bankruptcy to 
estimate the speed of adjustment.  
 
Table 18: Explaining Market Leverage Adjustment – Pre- and Post-Financial Crisis 
 
Dependent variable: 
∆Leverage deviation ∆Leverage deviation 
Year 0 to +3 Year 0 to +4 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Acquisition year deviation  -0.325* -0.622* -0.430** -0.709** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.004) (0.009) 
Acquisition year leverage  0.038 -0.170 0.031 -0.163 
 (0.776) (0.473) (0.831) (0.487) 
Sizet-1 0.007 0.013 0.015* 0.021 
 (0.240) (0.319) (0.023) (0.133) 
Profitt-1 -0.044 0.006 -0.036 0.160 
 (0.280) (0.978) (0.365) (0.473) 
Bankruptcy riskt-1 0.001** 0.002 0.000 0.008** 
 (0.006) (0.482) (0.250) (0.000) 
Cash/ Total Assetst-1 0.146* -0.013 0.243** 0.031 
 (0.019) (0.926) (0.000) (0.822) 
Taxes/ Total Assetst-1 0.581* 0.879 0.385 0.194 
 (0.020) (0.160) (0.224) (0.808) 
Market/Book Ratiot-1 0.002** 0.011 0.001* 0.023 
 (0.000) (0.400) (0.016) (0.157) 
Constant -0.078 -0.015 -0.118* -0.099 
 (0.061) (0.867) (0.025) (0.251) 
 
    
Number of obs. 512 152 494 122 
R square 0.173 0.250 0.199 0.342 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Target leverage is predicted through the 






Earlier, the results in Table 16 suggested that about 38% of an acquirer’s leverage deviation is 
reversed after four years. Considering the post-crisis acquisition sample, a high increase can be 
seen to up to 62%. The increase is demonstrated in both the three- and four-year period after 
the acquisition. Consequently, it is concluded that managers reverse the leverage deviation, on 
average, faster in the post-crisis years, according to the sample. Also, the models showed a 
significant positive correlation of the cash variable to changes in post-acquisition leverage 
deviation for the pre-crisis sample. This indicates that bidding firms with more cash reserves 
are more likely to reduce their leverage after the merger. Overall, the results of the pre- and 
post-crisis analysis showed that managers actively rebalance their capital structure after the 
merger, which supports the trade-off model.  
 
6. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
The aim of this thesis was to study capital structures in the context of merger and acquisition. 
The study uses a sample of 1,290 large acquisitions, which were completed between 1993 and 
2012. The first research question addresses whether the financial deficit of a firm to its target 
leverage ratio influences the choice of payment method. The evidence shows that bidding firms, 
which are overleveraged in comparison to their target ratio are less likely to pay for the 
transaction with cash. It is assumed that the majority of cash transactions are financed with 
debt; hence, already overleveraged firms do not further increase their leverage with an 
acquisition. According to the sample, overleveraged firms are more likely to use a mixed 
payment method of both equity and cash. One limitation of the current thesis is the lack of 
consideration for the mixed payments acquisition. To further support the claim that 
overleveraged firms are less likely to use cash, it could be interesting to study whether the 
proportion of stock in the mixed payment increase with higher overleverage. The results suggest 
that firms have target leverage ratios and try to not move further away from their target with 
the transaction.  
The second research question aims to study the changes in leverage caused by the transaction. 
Large acquisitions have a great potential to move firms further away from their target leverage 
but, at the same time, the transaction can also change the target leverage of the then combined 
firm. The results provide evidence that if the transaction increases the target ratios, managers 
are more likely to complete an acquisition, which will increase their firm’s leverage. 




firm in their acquisition decisions. Furthermore, the thesis showed that overleveraged firms are 
less likely to finance an acquisition, which would further increase their leverage. The thesis 
found that an increase of pre-acquisition leverage deviation by ten cents per dollar leads to a 
higher change in market leverage, when a measure for growth opportunities is included. This 
finding suggests that firms with greater growth opportunities take more advantage of a merger-
induced target leverage change to adjust towards target. 
Furthermore, the second research question focuses on whether firms convert towards a target 
ratio by studying the post-acquisition years. The acquisition sample of the thesis showed that 
firms adjust their market leverage towards target by 39% every year, on average, considering 
the whole sample. Moreover, the results illustrate that bidders reduce their leverage more 
towards the target in the years following the merger, when the pre-acquisition leverage 
deviation is higher. In addition, bidders are more likely to move towards target when they have 
higher growth opportunities. Addressing the financing effect of the merger, it is shown that 
about 47% of an acquirer’s leverage deviation caused by the merger is reversed after five years.   
Although the thesis shows that target leverage ratios are relevant in the context of acquisition, 
it is limited to annual fundamental data and annual market information. To further prove the 
importance of leverage targets, the market reactions of merger announcements could be 
examined. For instance, it could be tested whether leverage deficit plays a role in abnormal 
announcement returns. Furthermore, one could use quarterly data to measure the leverage 
deficit and include firms, which make several acquisitions per year.  
Lastly, the thesis studied the adjustment speeds by splitting the sample into pre- and post-
financial crisis. The adjustment speed for market leverage amounted to 47% for the pre-
financial crisis sample, while the post-crisis sample achieved a slightly higher speed of 49%.  
Furthermore, the post-crisis sample showed that 62% of the leverage effect of the merger is 
reversed after three years, which is a much higher proportion than the 32% reversal before the 
crisis. However, the thesis is limited in comparing both time periods because the sample only 
accounts for acquisitions completed up to 2012 and therefore, the post-crisis sample is rather 
small. Additionally, due to the small size of cash transactions, the conclusions of the first 
research question were not tested in the context of comparing the pre- and post-crisis sample.  
Overall, it can be concluded that firms converge towards a target ratio and that firms consider 
the leverage deviation in their acquisition decisions. Consequently, the thesis provides evidence 
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Appendix 1: Variable Description 
 
Variable Description  
    
Market Leverage book debt/ (total assets - book equity + market equity) 
Book Leverage book debt/ total assets 
Book Equity 
  
total assets - total liabilities + deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit + preferred stock 
Book Debt total assets - book equity 
Market Equity common shares outstanding * price closing 
    
Firm Size Ln (net sales) 
Profitability EBITDA/total assets 
Market to book ratio (total assets - book equity + market equity)/total assets 
Tangibility property plant & equipment net/total assets 
Selling Expense selling expense/net sale 
Depreciation  depreciation and amortization/total assets 
  
Cash/Total Assets cash and short-term investments/ total assets 
Tax/Total Assets income tax paid/ total assets 
Investment capital expenditure/ total asset 
Bankruptcy Risk 
 
(total assets)/ (3.3 times earnings before interest and taxes + 



























Appendix 2: Characteristics of Deals  
  
Characteristic Fraction of Sample 
  
Panel A: Consideration Structure 
Cash Only 41.6% 
Cash and Stock Combination 30.2% 
Stock Only 28.1% 
  
Panel B: Form of the Deal 
Merger 72.6% 
Acquisition of Assets 19.6% 
Acquisition of Partial Interest 3.8% 
Acquisition of Majority Interest 2.1% 
Acquisition of Remaining Interest 1.6% 
Buyback 0.2% 
Acquisition of Certain Assets 0.1% 
  





Not Appl. 0.2% 
  
Panel D: Cross Border 
Non-Cross Border 87.8% 




Appendix 3: Characteristic of Acquirer 
 
Characteristic Fraction of Sample 
   
Panel A: Multiple Acquirers 
Acquirers making one large acquisition 81% 
Acquirers making more than two large acquisition 15% 
Acquirers making two large acquisition 4% 
    
Panel B: TRBC Economic Sector of Acquirers 
Technology 24.93% 
Industrials 22.72% 
Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services 16.49% 
Healthcare 13.71% 
Basic Materials 7.09% 
Energy 6.52% 
Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods & Services 5.37% 





Appendix 4: Leverage Variation – Industry 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
      
Consumer Non-Durables 
Book Leverage 980 0.024 0.237 -2.385 0.549 
Market Leverage 980 0.095 0.214 -0.582 0.450 
Consumer Durables 
Book Leverage 424 -0.017 0.246 -1.534 0.485 
Market Leverage 424 - 0.056 0.245 -0.626 0.297 
Manufacturing 
Book Leverage 1,850 0.053 0.256 -2.192 1.100 
Market Leverage 1,850 0.091 0.219 -0.626 0.606 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 
Book Leverage 704 0.018 0.605 -12.039 0.910 
Market Leverage 704 0.073 0.204 -0.545 0.461 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Book Leverage 446 0.005 0.186 -1.111 0.529 
Market Leverage 446 0.042 0.187 -0.567 0.402 
Business Equipment 
Book Leverage 3,819 0.061 0.341 -8.192 2.492 
Market Leverage 3,815 0.074 0.188 - 0.733 0.487 
Telephone and Television Transmission 
Book Leverage 432 -0.009 0.363 -3.560 0.732 
Market Leverage 431 0.026 0.231 -0.548 0.561 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
Book Leverage 1,499 0.028 0.255 -2.793 1.597 
Market Leverage 1497 0.055 0.242 -0.582 0.578 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 
Book Leverage 1,246 0.064 0.334 -6.776 1.978 
Market Leverage 1,246 0.068 0.198 -0.799 0.406 
Not defined Industry Group 
Book Leverage 1,617 0.051 0.290 -2.895 2.427 















Appendix 5: Predicting Stock and Cash Acquisitions – Market Leverage 
        
Dependent Variable: Stock and Cash Payment = 1       
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation  -0.791*   -1.292*   
  (0.041)   (0.026)    
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B    0.528    
     (0.365)    
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation   -0.754  -0.815 
    (0.286)  (0.263) 
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B   
  
0.054 
    
  
(0.729) 
Cash/Total Assets 0.480 -0.093 0.572 -0.053 
  (0.441) (0.890) (0.365) (0.938) 
Tax/Total Assets -0.479 -0.745 -0.331 -0.581 
  (0.881) (0.824) (0.981) (0.864) 
Market/Book Ratio  -0.012 -0.021 -0.188 -0.0413 
  (0.219) (0.357) (0.230) (0.577) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.209) (0.115) (0.219) (0.114) 
Profitability 0.910 0.779 0.948 0.819 
  (0.143) (0.262) (0.159) (0.248) 
Firm Size -0.035 -0.081 -0.041 -0.081 
  (0.380) (0.056) (0.316) (0.055) 
Constant -0.588* -0.197 -0.356 -0.173 
  (0.044) (0.516) (0.319) (0.584) 
    
   
Pseudo R2  0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 
Number of observations  847 761 847 761 
Log pseudolikelihood -528.034 -481.630 -427.29 -482.231 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon 





















Appendix 6: Prediction Cash Acquisition – Book Leverage 
 
Dependent Variable: Cash Payment = 1         
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation 0.496   0.648   
  (0.131)    (0.237)   
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B   -0.082    
    (0.668)    
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation  0.014   -0.173  
   (0.974)   (0.940)  
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B      0.017 
        (0.940) 
Cash/Total Assets 0.678 0.903 0.685 1.030 
  (0.242) (0.150) (0.235) (0.114) 
Tax/Total Assets 2.218 0.221 2.2120 0.509 
  (0.464) (0.946) (0.463) (0.877) 
Market/Book Ratio  0.020 0.019 0.024 -0.030 
  (0.057) (0.417) (0.053) (0.644) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.062) (0.034) (0.064) (0.063) 
Profitability -1.620* -1.440* -1.600* -1.311 
  (0.015) (0.036) (0.015) (0.063) 
Firm Size 0.040 0.050 0.040 0.049 
  (0.300) (0.218) (0.301) (0.237) 
Constant -0.651* -0.731* -0.658* -0.665* 
  (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.029) 
          
Pseudo R2  0.013 0.010 0.013 0.011 
Number of observations  847 761 847 761 
Log pseudolikelihood -565.303 -506.247 -565.225 -505.820 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon 


















Appendix 7: Prediction Stock Acquisition – Book Leverage 
 
Dependent Variable: Stock Payment = 1         
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation -0.532  -0.783    
  (0.127)   (0.165)    
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B   0.120   
    (0.538)   
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation  0.008  0.501  
   (0.986)  (0.477)  
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation*M/B    -0.152 
        (0.528) 
Cash/Total Assets -1.157 -0.965 -1.147 -1.145 
  (0.112) (0.189) (0.089) (0.132) 
Tax/Total Assets -1.072 -0.571 1.034 -0.939 
  (0.760) (0.881) (0.765) (0.807) 
Market/Book Ratio  -0.012 -0.008 -0.018 0.0571 
  (0.668) (0.748) (0.323) (0.396) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.723) (0.300) (0.473) (0.315) 
Profitability 1.738 1.453 1.722 1.242 
  (0.058) (0.162) (0.065) (0.223) 
Firm Size 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.031 
  (0.997) (0.533) (0.997) (0.503) 
Constant -0.991** -1.223** 0.982** -1.302** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
          
Pseudo R2  0.014 0.010 0.015 0.011 
Number of observations  847 761 847 761 
Log pseudolikelihood -488.198 -439.057 -488.063 -438.490 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Logit regressions are estimated with 
robust standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon 



















Appendix 8: Explaning Leverage Change of Acquistion – Book Leverage 
 
Dependent Variable: Leverage in the year following the merger minus leverage in the 
year prior to the merger – Book Leverage  
         
Pre-acquisition year leverage deviation 0.165**  0.231*    
  (0.008)   (0.028)    
Pre-acquisition year in leverage deviation*M/B   -0.034    
    (0.395)    
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage deviation  0.139   0.141 
   (0.145)   (0.197) 
Pre-acquisition year change in leverage 
deviation*M/B  
    0.000 
       (0.925) 
Merger induced change in lev. deviation -1.189* -0.728** -1.184* -0.729** 
  (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Cash/Total Assets -0.177 -0.003 -0.176 -0.004 
  (0.138) (0.953) (0.139) (0.936) 
Tax/Total Assets 0.219 0.153 0.259 0.149 
  (0.725) (0.568) (0.676) (0.568) 
Market/Book Ratio  0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.007 
  (0.737) (0.100) (0.676) (0.186) 
Deal Value/ pre-acquisition year Total Assets 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.259) (0.047) (0.247) (0.045) 
Profitability -0.306 -0.072 -0.310 -0.736 
  (0.319) (0.486) (0.308) (0.490) 
Firm Size -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
  (0.413) (0.703) (0.423) (0.708) 
Constant 0.088 0.042 0.086 0.042 
  (0.184) (0.066) (0.191) (0.058) 
         
R-squared 0.351 0.480 0.352 0.480 
Number of observations  759 678 759 678 
The * represents a 5% significance level, while ** indicates a 1% significance level. Regressions are estimated with robust 
standard errors. Target leverage is predicted through the Tobit model. P-value in parenthesis. Models built upon Harford et 
al. (2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
